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On 1'-larch 1, 1977, a former great maritime power
began to once again assert itself on the waters of the earth.
On that date, the United states erected ~n invisible, but
hopefuJ.ly invincible wall 200 miles from its coastline.
This wall was deemed necessary by the people and the
Congress as the only means available to ensure the survival
of (1) the living resources in t~e waters off our coast,
and (2) those who make their living by harvesting those
resources.
It had become apparent to the u.s. fisherman and
the government that the many international regulations and
agreements we r'e not an efficient means of protecting the
fishery resource in the waters off the U.S. coast. Many
species that were once a significant portion of the ~nerlcan
fisherman's catch were being threatened with extinction by
the tremendous fishing effort of the modern flects of the
Soviet uni6n, Japan, Poland, ~nd Germany.
The case of the haddock illustrates quite well
exactly what had happened off the coast of the United states
during the past 20 years. In 1960, New England·fishermen
brought back 46 thousand tons of haddock, worth over 11
million dollars, to their respective porLs. It was during
1960 that those same American fishermen began to share the
However, the decline in the following years
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the wat.e ;':') off New England with the modern fleets of Japan,
Poland, and the Soviet Union. By 1965, the haddock catch
for New England fishermen had increased to 155 thousand
. t 1metr~c ons.
was dramatic, to ~ay the least. In only five years, the
catch had declined to a mere 13,000 metric tons, a decrease
of 92% from the high in 1965. By 1974, the catch had
declined to 5,000 luetric tons, or 3% of 't he 1965 catch.
Since haddock was and still is an important segment of
the fresh-fish market in the U.S., this decline in catch
meant a significant decline in the earnings of the American
fisherman.
One of the goals of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 was the rebuilding of the American
fishing industry. However, the Act does not give the U.S.
fisherman exclusive rights to the fishery resource. The
American fisherman will still be competing with the foreign
fleets. Section 204 (b) (1) of the F~shery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976. states:
!lEach foreign nation wi~h which the United
States has entered into a governing inter-
national agreement shall submit ~n applica-
tion Lo the Secretary of state each ·year
for a permit f'o r- each of its f~shi.ng vessels
to engage in fishing described in subsection (A).II
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It appears, therefore, that there will be a few
gates in this wall. Who comes through these gat.es will be
determined by the state Department, the Regional Councils,
and the Secretary of Con~erce. However, the size of the
gates \\Ii11 b e determined by the Regional Councils as
provided under the provisions of Section 303 subsection 4
(B):
IlAny fishery managemen-t- plan which is
prepared by any council, or by the
Secretary, with respect to any fishery
shall assess and specify the capacity
and the extent to which fishing vessels
of the United States, on an annual basis,
will harvest the optimwn yield specified
under paragraph 3 and the portion of such
optimum yield which, on an annual basis,
will not be harvested by fishing vessels
of the United States and can be made
available for foreign fishing. II
For the first year of this Act, the Department of
Commerce, with the help of its National Marine Fisheries
Branch, will establish the optimum yield and whether or not
there will be surpluses available to the foreign fleets.
Therefore, for the first year the government will decide
the size of the gate and t.o whom to sell tickets.
We, therefore, come to the process of establishing
a ticket price at the gate. 1'hc Fishery Act states in
Section 204, subsection 10:
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I!Reasonablc fees shall be paid to the Secretary
by the owner or operator of any foreign fishing
vessel for \....hich a permit is issued..... In
determining the Lev e L of s u ch fees) the
SecreLary may take into account the cost of
carrying out the provisions of this Act with
r-o spec t; to foreign fishing, .i.nc Lud.i.ng but, not
limit.ed to, the cost of fishery conservation
and management, fisheries research, administra-
tion and enforcement."
In attempting to ascertain what is "reasonable"
the Secretary must consider many factors, one of which
should be: How much profit do the nations fishing off the
coast of the United States derive from the sale of those
fish caught in the coastal waters of the United states?
Without the economic facts reflecting the performance of a
foreign nation fishing off our coasts, the Secretary, in
assessing the fees, lS making a subjective decision at best.
This decision will also be influenced by the petitions of
the foreign governments applying for permits o Given~
therefo r-e, that these fees are applied nondiscriminately,
they should be based on a model of economic efficiency.
To do otherwise would be rather uri-c Ame r-Lc an as it would be
rewarding permits to operations which might be wasteful and
inefficient. If it is found that a high profit"can be
derived by the catching and selling of UoS. fish by foreign
nations, then what is determined to be a reasonable fee ai~
present might be adjusted in the future to reflect the net
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earnings of those foreign fleets.
Unfortunately, the United states is one of the
few nations in the world today which does not directly
subsidize .i t .s. f Lsh i.ng fleet.througt1 p ri.c o supports, es h i.p
building grants, import quotas, and fuel subsidies.
Because of the massive subsidies provided by their
governments, foreign fishermen can operate off our coasts
often, regardless of cost and degree of econom~c efficiency.
It is, therefore, difficult to determine how much profit a
foreign fisherman can make in the catching of fish 2 within
200 miles off the coast of the United states. The question
may be r a.i.s o d , why bother to determine the level of profit,-
ability whe? the Act states that. the fees shall be appJied
nondiscrininately.
The answer lies in the complex goals of the
Fishery Act. The first reason is to determine if present
fines for violations of the Act arc high enough to encourage
compliance with the law.
Violations of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act conunitted by for.eign vessels go through a
long procedural and bureaucratic process before legal action
is taken against the violator. Recent history has shown
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that the state Department has much to say in the matter of
the size o f fines, and whether or not to s oLzc a vessel
3
which is violating the Act. Fines for violations can range
from $500 to $25,000 depending on the nature of - the offense,
who conunitted it, and the re Latzi.on s h.i.p between the United
States government and the goverrunent of the offender. It,
therefore, becomes quite obvious that the incen-eive to obey
the law 18 lacking, and that the payment of fines may become
another fixed cost operation. Indeed, it may be more profit~
able to break the law and pay the fine than to comply wi.bh
the law. Without a measure of profitability, it would be
difficult to determine whether or not a country could sustain
a number of fines in order to continue fishing within our
200-mile zone. If a country call indeed absorb a certain
level of i::"Iles and still be prof.itable, then i t may be
necessary to legislate a higher and more rigid structure of
fines. At present, the Act gives the offending country and
the Secretary of Conunerce a great deal of negotiating room
in the assessment and payment of fines. Section 308 sub-
section (d) states:
"Compromise or other acti..on by the Secretary
The Secretary may compromise, modiCy, or
remit, with or without conditions, any civil
penalty which is subject to' imposition or
which has been imposed under this section. 1I
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Wit,hout an understanding of revenues received
for their fish, it would appear difficult to attain the
goal of one of NOAA's counsels,Richard Solomon. He
stated in a telephone ~nterview that it was his feeling
that violations, and especially resource violations,
should be treated in such a way as to make sure that
those violations will be unp r-of itab Le for the violator. 4
One of the many goals of the Fishery Act is the
rebuilding and r-evLt.aLi.z a t.Lon of the domestic fishing fleet.
It is hoped that those underutilized species, formerly
caught off our coasts by other nations, might become a new
source of revenue for the fishermen of the United states.
However, for t.his goal to be realized, it will require
that new rn :~ans of fishing be accepted by an industry which
is slow to accept new techniques, and the potential change
in lifestyles required by these new techniques. One of the
incentives to accept a new technique and its potential
required lifestyle change is the measure of profitability
the new techniques will de Li.ve r-, The question, ,therefore,
/
must be raised: Can the present U.S. fleet, which is mostly
comprised of vessels of less than 200 gross tons, success-
fully harvest those underutilizcd species such as hake,
herring, squid, and mackerel in sufficient enough quantity
to support the economic growth which was a ho~ed for goal
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of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976?
If not, should the United states seek to ensure the benefits
of a 200-m~le limit by encouraging the building of a fleet
of larger ve.s.s~Js which could economically harvest those
underutilized species? The an swe r to this qu.estion depends
on the phrase Ileconomically harvest," and thus another'
reason for this study of the Soviet fleeto Kaczynski,
(1977) states that Russian, Palish, East German, and
Bulgarian fleets are and have been buiLt and operated at a
heavy financial loss. The purpose of this study will be to
examine the micro economic workings of the Soviet fleet off
the waters of New England from 1960-1974 to see if indeed
this conclusion is true.
:.,of' " i l l not, however, a t.t.empt to analyze the
actual economic process of the Soviet fleet. This would be
practically impossible due to many reasons. First, there
is very little reliable information regarding the profit-
ability of the Soviet fleet and indeed anything to do with
the Soviet fishing fleet. There arc estimates as to its
size and its influence on the economy, but these are only
estimates and until an objective economist from the west is
per-mit-ted access to the now classified information regarding
Soviet fishing fleet operation, we will have to rely on
estimates and whatever neh'S the Soviets do release. Second,
a distinction must be made bet.we eri western free market economies
and ea~tern controlled economies. In other wor'ds , what is
profitable in the Soviet Union may be the road to hankruptcy
in a western free market economy. Syseov in his book
"Eco norni.c s of the Soviet Fishing Industry" .i L'Luss t.r-at.e s this
point well in his financial plan or scheme of a typical
industrial ministry within the Soviet Union. Nowh o r-o under
the section rnarke d "Expendi.t.ur'es and De due tion II c an any
expenditure for interest' be found. This is because money is
given from the state to the ministry interest free. He states:
ItCapital investments are financed by the
state budget, taxes from cooperative and
social o r'gan.i z a 'bLons , and taxes on profits
of industry, and some s pe c La L ont.e r-pri.s e
f u n clss , II
Another interesting problem with Soviet enterprise
is the concept of depreciation. In the west, depreciation is
mostly an economic termo It describes the process of economic
obsolescence that all equipment must go through. Depreciation
is also very important when ascertaining the total value of
an industry for tax and other monetary purposes.' However, in
the Soviet Union, depreciation is mostly a concept to describe
the physical inability of an asset. Lo perform it,s economic
function. In fact, Syseov uses the word obsolescence instead
of dep r-e c i.a t.Lon ,
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He states that the value of a typical
5fishing vessel drops approximately 3% a yeBr o This would
give it an economic life of 33 years. Syseov states:
!IUnder socialism, the replacement of old
physically useful machinery by more perfect
machinery is carried out in the interest
of r a i s i ng productivity of labor and
increasing the social product. The socialist
state determines in a planned manner the
trends and rates of renewal of fixed assets."
Notice that nowhere is profit used as a motive
for increasing production or other investment decisions,
yet, this fleet is operating in the waters of a nation
whose fundamental goals are often e~pressed in terms of
economic p r'o f i,t.
I~, t h e r e f o rci , seems clear that the United states
must atteillpt to analyze the economics of the fleets which
will operate within its newly created 200-mile fisheries
zone. In establishing an Iroptimwll y Le Ld " of a certain
stock or species of fish, the economic efficiency of all
fleets should be considered. To do this, all fleets must
be examined within a western economic f o r -ma t , Free market
prices should be the basis of output figures, and have been
used in this study. The determin ntion of standards of
operation should be examined and formulated so that studies
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will be consistent and able to withstand the challenges
of both the domestic industry and those governments whose
fleets desire to fish off our coastso Without such infor-
mation, management decisions concerning either the resource
or the economics of harvesting the resource will be highly
subjective, open to challenge} and contrary to the goals
and spirit of the Fisheries and Conservation Management
Act of 1976.
OUTPUT
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The coastal waters of the Nort.hwest Atlantic
have for centuries provided the f i s h e r me n of Canada,
Greenland, and the United states ~ith a seemingly in-
exhausible supply of fish o It was the bountiful harvest
from these waters that attracted many of the initial
residents of t.h i .s part of the world. However', the coming
of technology soon made it possible for other nations to
share in the harvesting of this vast resource. This
technology had its earliest manifestation in the form of
well-designed schooners from Portugal which uses flects
of individually manned dories to catch cod. The latest
manifestations of this technology are the sleek, efficient
supertrawlers from the Soviet Union which are capable of
staying at sea for 90 days at a time, and can process
almost 70 tons of fish a dayo6
During the late 19~0Is, the pressure exerted by
the many fleets on the stocks of fish in the Northwest
Atlantic area was so great t.hat. i t became apparent that catch
limits would have to be instituted if the fish stocks of
this area were to be saved from extinction. Therefore, on
July 3, 19.50) the Tnter-nationill Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was convened and s t-a r-t.e d t~he
difficult tilsk of managing the many species of fish in this
area.,
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At first, the only nations involved in the
convention were those with a traditional interest in the
area, such as Canada, the United states, Great Britain,
Iceland, Franc e , and Portugal. But as Germany, Poland,
and the Soviet Union started to finish the task of
rebu:Llding their homelands destroyed by Wor'ld War II,
they aggressively began building a distant-water fishing
fleet that would help meet the protein demands of their
fast growing populations. In 1959, the Soviet fleet in
particular made a rather impressive arrival in the North-
west Atlantic. In that year, ~hei r newly arrived ·f l e e t
numbered 111 vessels, with an average size of 1,140 tons. 7
The only other nation to come close to this average size
vessel \..as Portugal, with an average size of 995 Lon s ,
All of th~s~ Soviet vessels were efficlcnt fishing platforms,
and their effort resulted in a dramatic increase in the
catch statistics for the Northwest Atlantic.
By the use of the graph in Figure 1, it can be
seen that the arrival of the Soviet fleet had a dramatic
effect on the total landings for the ICNAF area. In 1968,
the landings peaked w~th a total of 4,599,000 metr"c tons
of fish. This peak was more or less sustained up until
1974, but only becau.se of the amount of fish being c aught;
by the Soviet fleet. If one su.btracts the Sovie·t share of
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the total catch, it becomes qul.t.e evident just how fast
the stock,::; were declining in the ICNAF areao The Soviet
fleet managed t.o steadily increase its catch during the
years from 1960-1973~ It went from 25 8,000 metri.c tons
to 1,357,000 metric tons, an increase of 525%. If one
examines Figure 1 even closer, it becomes apparent that
the increasing catch of the Soviet. fleet was due in part
to their fishing activity in areas 5 and 6, or off the
coast of New Erig Lan d , Indeed, the waters off the coast
of New England have consistently provided about 30-40%
of the tot~l catch in ICNAF waters.
The importance of Georges Bank and the rest of
the waters off the New England coast to the Soviet fleet
c an be more accurately assess ed in Figllre.3. Al~ first,
in 1961, the Soviets experienced little return in this
area when compared to what they were catching in other
/
I
areas of the Northwest Atlantic. But then, in 1962, a
trend st,artcd that was to continue for eight years until
1969. That trend was an increased effort in this area to
the point wh~re, over that period, 52% of the 't o t a l Soviet
catch in ICNAF waters was caught off the shores of New
England. During this same period, the Soviet fleet accounted
for 257~ of all the fish c augh t. in a re a s 5 and 6. At this
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time, there were at least five other nations actively
fishing this area.
It bcomes apparent, therefore, that along with
the fishermen of New England, -t he Soviet f i s h e r me n knew
a good thing when they saw it. 'I'ho i.r- effort; off our
coastline resulted in over 50% of their total catch in
the Northwest Atlantic, and required substantial invest-
ment and direction. In attempting to determine the final
potential gain to them, one must proceed on a species-by-
species analysis of their catch.
Figure 4 begins this analysis in subarea 5 or
that area which is immediately adjacent to the coast of
New England. From this area, the Soviets harvested mostly
underut.i..l':"'~ed iish, such a:s herring and silver hake. What
is done with this catch is not entirely known. Syseov (1970)
stat~s that in 1968,429,000 tons of herring was salted in
the Soviet Union. The herring catch in area 5 would,
therefore, have provided about 28% of the total output of
salted herring for that year. It is known that most of the
silver hake is dressed and frozen right on board the trawlers
:t he ms e l v e s . 8 Therefore, it can be assumed that most of this
ca-t:.ch is going to the Soviet consume r in the round, and not
being turned into fishmeal. It is interesting to note that
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after 1969 species which are easier to dress, such as
silver hake and mackerel, were h ar-v e s t.e d in greater
nwnbers than herring. This may in part be due to the
Soviet consume rfs reluctance to buy salted herring when
frozen hake or mackerel can be purchased insteado
Figure 5 gives a picture of those species con-
sidered as valuable, i.e., cod, haddock, and flounder.
The most striking aspect of this graph is the tremendous
pressure the Soviet fleet exerted on the haddock stock for
three years, from 1964-1967, the result being that the
stock was almost wiped out, and i s still in very poor shape
because of this intensive pr~ssure. All of these fish are
either filleted and then frozen, or dressed and frozen.
They represent the "cream of the c r-op " and command p r-em i.um
prlces from the Soviets or any other consumer. SOllle of the
cod is frozen into blocks for export to other communist
countries.
Soviet fishing activity in arca 6 during this
period wa s much less than that in arca 5.. Its most productive
year was 1966, the first year that statistics we,re recorded
-f'o r- this area. In that year, 1 30 , 00 0 met.r-Lc tons were
caught, 92,000 tons of which were silver hake .. However,
mackerel soon became the primary species being caught in
this area with 247,000 metric tons being harvC;jtcd during the
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By returning to Figure 1, onc can see
that. at no time did the Soviet catch in area 6 ever' become
more than 19%, and most of the time it represented only
10-14% of the total ca-tch in this area.
In area 6, species with a high value were caught
in fairly limited quantities. Flounder was the only
specles caught in any significant amount with a total of
3,187 tons being h ar-v est.ed during 1968-1974. Figure 7 is
proof again of the importance of the Georges Bank area as
a producer of h igh value groundfish. Area 6 corresponds to
the mid-Atlantic coast of our e as t.e rn scabbard, and has
historically never had a productive offshore fishery.
Most of its volume comes from the inshore fishery for
shrimp, menh~den, and oysters in and around Chesapeake Bay.
PRICE
Because of the nature of the Soviet economy, it
is difficult for a westerner to attempt to produce a balance
sheet for the fishing flect that will have meaning in a
demand type economic system, such as that in the United
stateso Syseov states:
IIAll the prices of similar goods arc fixed in
Soviet industry as single prices, proceeding
from the mean branch expenditures on pro(~ction•••
Thus, the prices express all aspects of the
complex process of reproduction of the gross
social product, and social and other aspects. II
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However, the fish being harves~cd within our
200-mile conservation zone are entering many types of
economic systems, most of which are similar to the demand
system of the United states. 'I'Iie r-cf'o r'e , it. beomes necessary,
in the preservation of fairness, to apply a common price to
the f ish being harvested off our coasts, if we are to come
up with a potential profit-loss estimate for the many fleets
off our coasts. Of further interest is that, by using a
western economic system and free world prices, it can be
det.e rmd ne d if fishing on a scale as large as the Soviets
might be profitable and, therefore, feasible for the fisher-
men of the United. states.
'..ihere, therefore, does one find a consistent
source of the price of fish? The answer to that question
lies in another question, and also depends on how consistent
you feel your source must be. The other question is, wha t.
price do you mean, the ex-vessel, the wholesale, or the
retail? This researcher felt that to accurately reflect
the wo r t.h of some commodity to a country, one must examine
the prlce that country receives for its goods, from the
country or co ns umo r- to whom it is selling. However, this
technique runs afoul of the standard of consistency. An
example of this is the sta"tistics from the U. S. Census
Bureau on values and amounts of imported fish o
-19-
During the early 1960's, there were seven
catego~ic5 of species which could be used as the basis of
an average price for the purposes of this report. By 1973,
there were only four categories. For some of the years,
imports were r e co r-de d from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, but
that was only from 1965-1974 and only for frozen cod.
Therefore, the use of these statistics would fail the consis-
tency requirement.
The lack of consistency can also be used for a
reason to not use the FAD export prices. The FAD, while
/
commendable in its desire to expand on types and categories,
fails the researcher when after a six-year period, a par-
ticularly useful category is suddenly deleted.
Th e final source which was used to provide a
bas1s for research was found at the ex-vessel level of
prices, due to the fact that during the study period all
species of fish being recorded remained in the same category.
This, however, meant that all prices be converted to dollars,
as ex-vessel prices are hi~torically recorded in the native
currencyo
Another problem to be overcome was that the
relevancy of the species of fish being used must be sub-
stantiated. It would clearly be inaccurate to include English
-20-
whiting in the averi1ge international price of silver hake,
simply b ecause silver hake is often called whiting in the
United s tates. It would also be inaccurate to include
Pacific mackerel into the average price of Atlantic mackerel.
The technique which was devised is as follows.
It was determined where else in the world the six species
being used for this report were landed. The 'f i v e most
productive countries were then grouped together to form
the data base from which the total average value, no"t
average pricb, was culled. For example, herring is caught
by many cquntries, but for this study we used the landings
and values of Canada, the United States, Denmark, West
Germany, and Gre at; Britain. These five countries catch a
great deal of sea herring and are heavily involved in the
import and export of this product. The species being
studied in this report were chosen partially because of
their use by many different countrJ.es, and have a historical
pattern that has been fairly well recorded.
The results of their technique can be found in
Figure 8, which is fairly self-explanatoryo By combining
, t h e prices from F.i.gure 8 and the out.put; of the Soviet. fleet,
we are able to come up with the following information. We
now have a fairly good estimate of what the Soviet Union
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would have paid ~Ierican fishermen for the fish landed by
'the Soviet fleet. To clarify further., if the Soviet Union
had a free murket demand type economy, and it participated
in wo rLd trade, .i, tEo; f Le eL would have h ad ,the fo llowing
gross income for the year's from 1961-1973. It would have
earned $47,260,000 for high value species, such as cod,
haddock, and flounder. It would have earned $241,300,000
for the low value or underutilized species, such as hake,
herring, and mackerel. Therefore, for these six species,
it wouLd have earned $288,56°9°00. The total earnings
figure for the Soviet fleet is probably a great deal
higher than this last figure due to the c at.chi.ng of mariy
other important high value species, such as halibut or
squid. However, it was impossible to collect data on
these species as the landings were recorded in an incon-
sistent manner. There is a smaller data base from which
to figure an average price, so that the total worth of the
species to the Soviet fleet might be dominated by the price
generated by one country. It wouLd , for instance, be
inconsistent to determine ' an average price of squid because
of the fluctuations of the landings Lind the aome t i.mcs
domi.n a nc e of thc market p r-Lc o by a country such as Spain or
Japan. However, it is possible to establish a world-wide
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average value of all f~shery products at the ex-vessel
level. This f~gure has been determined and is reflected
in Figure 9 under the category of "all species." Using
this world-Hide Cl.verag-e value, \'/e are able to establish
the estimated total worth of all the species landed by
the Soviet fleet from 1961-1973 in the waters off the New
England COast. It is estimated" therefore, that had this
fish been caugh-t by a western free market economy fleet,
such as the West German fleet, the fleet would have re-
ceived $1,143,600,000 for its catch.
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The development of data to detenulne the Soviet
level of input for the area and time being considered is
a task of e s t i.ma t.Lo n , extrapolation, and de t.e rmLnat.Lon ,
The re a.so n s [D r' this are ma ny but , as stated .i.n thc:~ .i.ntro-
duction, cenLer around the lack of hard facts and informa-
tion with which to deal. On a subjective level, it is
common knowledge t,hat the Soviet fishing Elect is composed
of large, modern, and efficient trawlers of all designs
and purposes"
It has been estimated that from 1946-1965, the
Soviet Union invested over 4 billion dollars in the 1'e-
construction, modernization, and development of its fishing
9industry" We do not have figures on how many new shoresidc
f ac i.j..i Li(~ ~ were co ns t.r-uct.e d during thIs period" We do,
however, have Lnf'o r-m at.Lon concerning the size, nwnber, and
cost of the offshore fleet and~ therefore~ can estimate a
level of costs for the fleet in the waters off the New -
England coast from 1961-1.973. We can combine these estimated
cost figures w~th the estimated production figures to arrive
at an estimated net figure for the time period" The word
jUe s t i ma t c ll cannot be used enough in this study, due to the
lack of consistent statistics con~iled by ICNAF and lack of
operational procedures which migh affect the economic, not
-24-
harvesting, eff iciency of the Soviet offshore fleet.
The Soviet fleet that first arrived in the waters
of the Northwest Atlant~c was not an especially impressive
s i.ght , The re were a few ofLhe larger new D:-lR'.l' class, but
the majority of the fleet was comprised of older sid~
trawlers having a gross tonnage of 704 or less, and a horse-
power of less than 800. An analogy that might be useful is
found in the airline industry during this same period.
There were still many DC-3's flying and carrying passengers,
and the ne\~ 707' s were yet to be the s'tandard.
The first of the Sovietrs offshore vessels came
under the designation of RT or large side trawlers o They
were built in Finland and Sweden, but many were built in
1 .• ~ . t ' 10l;, 1e late :Li),j'O·.3 oy Great Br-L a t.n , Tho RT207, Sever of -the
Murmansk fleet is a good e~ample of this early offshore
vessel. Built by Great Britain in 1956, it fished off the
11New England coast from 1959-1965, was 57 meter or 142 feet
long, and weighed 685 gross tons. The boat was fairly
modern in that it had two ~efrigeI'ated cargo hold.s kept cool
by a Freon-12 cooling system. It was powered b~ an 1100
'ho r s e p owe r diesel, which gave it a top speed o f almost 13
knots" The cost of construction of this vessel has been
estimated to be 2 mi.llion dollars 12 The Gydni.a Shipyard of
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Poland has indicated that a vessel of similar s~ze and weight
could be built today for about 3.5-4 million dollars. 13
It soon became evident through operational com-
p a r Ls on s that t h e large s t.e r n 't r awl e r s were much more
efficient than the RT or side trawlers. A stern trawler
could fish in much heavior weather, due to its ability to
face the seas during the hauling and setting of the net,
instead of having to lie side to the sea while hauling back.
The statis·tics for the No r-t.hwe s t; Atlantic bear this out.
In 1960, there were 33 BMRT stern trawlers fishing all of
the ICNAF waters. By 1965, there were 98, or an increase
of almost 200%. In 1971, there'were 186 BMRTl s in the ICNAF
convention area or an increase of 600% in ten years. 14 The
Soviet fleet had certainly gone through a drastic change in
just ten years. Yet, despite this tremendous growth in the
numoer of larger vessels, the effort off the New England
coast was being pursued by the boats of the RT size as is
borne out in the days on the grounds graph on Figure 2.
Only during two years, 1966 and 1973, were more days put
into the total fishing effort by the large BMRT's ~lan by
the smaller RT'sD
Yet, despite this higher effort by 'th e smaller RT's,
the new B~RTfS contributed significantly to the overall
-26-
harvesting capability on the Soviet fleet. COlllonly known as
factory t.r-aw Le r-s , these BMRT's have many things in common
despite their being built in many different countries and
having many different sizes. The Hflj<1kovskij class, an e a r-Ly
class of m1RT, was started in 1957. This class was similar
to the later Atlantik class which was built in Poland and
East Germany during the 1960's. These vessels were different
from the earlier RT's in many wayso First, they were capable
of processing the fish while underway or fishing o The RT
class could merely hold the fish until it offloaded, either
on a factory ship or a plant on a ho r-e , This processing
capability meant that a BMRT was an entity unto itself, and
did not need to worry about returning to offload fish and
renew supplies. They had a range of 16,000-17,000 nautical
miles and could stay at sea for up to 90 days. It had a
crew of 104 people or enough to guarantee 24-hour round the
clock fishing, navigating, and processing. The stern trawler
itself is a more efricient and versatile fishing platfonn.
(This concept is proven in the growing nwnbers of new UoS.
stern trawlers) which have 'been recently built to take
advantage of the Fishery Conse Y'V ab.i.on and Managcmenb Act;
almost 100% of all the new UoS. vessels built for finfishing
arc ster'n .t r' Cl\vl e Y' s ) . The size of these BHRT f S was and is
another contI~buting factor to their success as a fishing
platfor:ll~
-27-
Having an average of 3,000 gross registered tons,
they only .3 t .op fishing in wi.n ds in excess of 60 knots, and,
therefore., can fish more days as opposed to their counter-
part RT r s] wh Lc h must, heave-to because of rough s e as , 15
In analyzing that portion of the Soviet fleet which
fished in ICNAF areas 5 and 6, we mllst use what data is
available. In this respect, 'the only commonly .r-e co r-de d
indication of effort was the days on the grounds spent by
a certain tonnage classo We can analy~e what vessels make
up the tonnage class, but we cannot estimate the number of
vessels it took to harvest a certain number of tons of fish o
This is because the vessels in the Soviet fleet fished in
all of the ICNAF areas, no'(; just 5 and 6~ We can, howev e r-,
come up w i.t.h a figure which can be trans La t e d into a cost
f i.gur-e , 'I'h i s figure is based upon Lhe number of days on the
grouncLso An example is as followso In 1966, there were
12,889 days spent on the grounds by vessels which registered
over 2,000 gross tons o By finding wh a t the typical vessel of
this ICNAF class might be for the Soviet fleet, we can arrive
at one of the primary levels of investment for that particular
year.. The result would be a figure that could DC arrived at
in any numbe r- of ways, such as 100 ships of 2,200 t.on s each
working 100 days. By figuring the cost per ton for construction
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and operation of that class, one can arrive at a total
economic input for the vessels -Lhcmselves. For 1966, there
were 12,889 days on the grounds by vessels over 2,000 tons,
which could have been produced by 37 ships working 350 days
a year, or 85 ships working 150 days of the year. To clarify
further, h'hat is needed is not necessarily the total numbe r
of vessels, out the class of v e a s e Ls and the days that class
spent on ~h e grounds. How then can one arrive at a daiJ.y
cost of operations for the various classes of vessels?
For the purpose of this report, the cost of daily
operations a r'c based on the consumption of co na umab Le and
expendable items such as fuel and supplies. The daily
conswnption of twine, food, wire, and other si.milar items
are difficu lt to estimate due to il lack of information
concerning these items. lfuwever, one can make a fair estimate
of the total conswnption of fuel based on an average day.
For this report, days on ground and days fishing will be
considered the same. The reasons for this are that conswnption
of fuel on board a vessel occurs regardless of what it is
doing. :>tost of the time the main and aux.i.Li.a r-y engines arc at
maximLUn use due to the normal demands of just operating
vessels of this size. Another reason for the statistical
grouping together of these two categories 1S that the days on
-29-
the grou:~d3 is the larger of the two categories and, therefore,
the more o';ICCUI'ate as to the total amount of fuel consumed for'
a specific catch.
There were three main c Lu.ss e s of vessels which
fished off the New England coast as can be seen in Figure I.
For the purposes of simplicity, these classes will be rep r.e-
sented by what is considered to be the vessel which is most
representive of that class. In class 7, or over 2,000 tons,
that vessel is the BMRT of the Majakovskij class having 2,000
horsepower. The SRTR or M having a horsepower of 540
represents the vessels for class 5, and the slIlall SRT having
400 horsepower are representive of class 4. 'fa determine
fuel use, therefore, we simply establish a fuel rate based
on engine dern an d and horsepower, and mu Lt.Lp Ly it by the total
number of days for that particular class of vessel.
The horsepower statistics for these vessels
represent peak demand, such as would occur on a vessel while
at its highest cruising velocityo
I
Howeve r, these v e ss'e Ls
have varying power demand ano one must, therefore, arrive at
what seems to be a reasonable average demand fOI' ho ns epowe r-
on a ship of this nature. Syscov (1970) uses a BMR'r to
demonstrate the hourly expenditures for an avera.ge vessel.
However, he does not .i n di c a t e where this average Bl>lRT is
f ishing.
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But, based on his figures, a t.yp i.c a L BHR'r uses 5.65
tons of diesel per day while at sea. This figure includes
time fishing, in transi-t, and remaining in the area but not
f i h i 1615 lng. If we were to use peak horsepower as a basis of
demand, a BMRT of 2,000 horsepower would burn 9.8 tons of
diesel per day. Using Syseov1s example, we Can estimate that
on an average the Soviet vessels use 60% of available horso-
power wh i.Le at sea. Therefore, a typical BMRT will consume
an average 1,727 gallons per day while on the grounds. This
figure represents an average, and would increase should it
be shown that the vessel is fishing more than would be
typical for its class. In Sysc6v's example, the vessel is
at sea for 280 days, 207 of which it is fishing. If the
vessel uses 90% of available powe r while fishing, and the
percentage of fishing days were increased, fuel consumption
would obviously increase. It, therefore, would seem valid
to have two figures fa r- f'u.e L conswnption, a minimum and a
maximum> based on horsepower demand. In Syseovls example,
fishing time comprises 74% of the time at sea. This figure
would appear to be a reasonable mi.ni.mum due to the BMRTI s
ability t.o fish in almost any weather c on d i.t.Lon ,' 'Therefore,
if a vessel were to fish 90% of its time at sea, its fuel
consump t.Lo n would be an estimated 805 tons, or 2,514 gallons
per day, or an increase of almost 70%.
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To conclude, it would appear that for the purposes of this
r-e po r-b , , two fuel consumption models will be u t.Ll.Lze d , The
first, based on Syseovls model, will be a minimum based on
a 60% demand for horsepower, and the second based on a model
of increalSed fishing time, which would result in an average
87% horsepower demand. The results of these two figures
are given in Figure 3.
During this period, the pr-ice of Number 2 fuel oil
remained at a fairly consistent rate if bought in bulk
/
quantities. Figure 4 illu.strates the price of Numbe r 2
fuel purchased on the free market from 1961-1973 in dollars
per ton. It must be r e me mb e r e d that this was before the
drasti'c Pd~e incr~a~of 1973-l9 74. 1I00~ever, in analyzing
present SOVJ.ct ac t i. v i.t.Le s , one must rca J J.ze that the So v i.ec
Union is self-sufficient when it comes to oil demand, and
couId possibly maintain a comparably low fuel cost, even
today. However, in attempting to ascertain the profit-
ability of the Soviet fleet in a western economic s ys t.em ,
the price of fuel oil is perhaps the most critical expenditure
in the total operation o In analyzing Figure 5, therefore,
we begin to see -that due to 10\~· wo r Ld-ov.i.d e fue 1 prices dur-Lng
this time period, that the total fuel expenditure for the
Soviet fleet in ICNAF areas 5 and 6 is e s t.Lmat.e d at b e bwe e n
eight and fourteen million dollars. Not much considering
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the total returns for catch is estimated to be $1,]46,000,000.
Fuel co s t s wo u Ld have accounted, therefore, for between a
half to L 2;% of the total retut'n to the Soviet fleet, had it
in fact been operati.ng wi t.h f ree world prices.
'~ile fuel costs can be estimated based on
engineering principles, construction costs are altogether
another problem. Most of the BMRT I sand SRTR IS I...ere built
in either the Soviet Union or a satelite country of the
Soviet Union. The fixed economies of these countries can
place the construction cost of such vessels at an artificially
low level compared to what they might cost in another countryo
As Mr. Zdzislav Pienkawa of Centromor-North America indicated
in an interview concerning the b~ilding of Soviet fishery
vesscJ.s by Poland, the Soviet Union pays for its ships by
old fashioned trading methods. A Soviet Central Commi,ttee "
decides that" one BMRT is worth one thousand Soviet built
tractors or perhaps ten thousand barrIs of oiJ.. The only
indication of currency being passed from one country to
another is hidden somewhere in the central budget. Poland
and East Germany must accept the fact that the Soviet Union
feels that this BMRT is worth so many tractors or barrels of
. 17
oil.
Fortunately, there have been a few instances when
-33-
the Soviet Union did business in non-communist countries.
\~ also have figures which show what the PolIsh shipyards
expect in dollars for the various fishing vessels it now
build. In 1963, Japan and France both signed contracts
1 . t . t b . 1d b of t f 1 18with tle Sovle . Unlon 0 Ul anum er ypes o . vesse s.
The figures given for' the vessels built by the French indicate
an average of $1,500 per gross ton for a large factory stern
trawler, or $38,000 per meter. The Japanese were in that
same year building a similar vessel for an estilnated $35,000
per meter, or estimated $1,200 per gro~s ton. Due to world-
wide inflat~on, the price of a new large factory type trawler
has risen dramaticnlly. The var10US yards in Poland now
command an average of well over 100% from the prices of 1963.
The construction cost for a large tuna seiner in the United
S'tat.e s in 1977 was a bo u L $4,700 per ton, not~ much more than
th 1 · Po I d 19e yarcs 111 . an • Given these and other figures not
discussed here, we cnn construct an estimated construction
cost graph based on dol~ars per gross ton as shown in
Figure 6.
Given this figure, it now 1S necessary to decide
how the Soviet Union might best hnvc fished ICNAF areas
5 and 6, if those had been the only two a r'e a s wh e re their
fleet had fishedQ We have, as stated e a r Li.e r , the t.ot a L
number of days on the grounds by tonnage class, bu.t due to
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the movc::lcnt back and forth between areas, we can only
theorize and e xt r-apo Lat.e as to Lh e actual numbers of
vessels that were necessary to harvest the catch and
ae c umrnu Late the days 0 n the g r -oun ds • Using S ys cov 's BMRT
as an example for time on grounds spent by class 7, where
a 13MRT is on the grounds for 253 days of the calendar year,
it would take at least ten BMRl"s to fish and be on the
grounds f9r the number of days given for class 7 in 19610
The figures given by ICNAF for 1962, for example, show that
there were 21 BMRT's in areas 5 and 6; 18 of which were
there exclusively. Unfortunately, we only have this in-
formation every three years, and even it is not totally
accurate. So, it appears that combining the extrapolation
and the ICNAF data, we can estimate, the total number of
ships that we re ne ces s ary to catch the fish in the given
time period that has been recordedo This estimation is
recorded by the graph on Figure 70 These figures are based
on the percentage of calendar days spent at sea supplied by
Syseov in his analysis of the Soviet fishing industry.20
In analyzing the graph on Figure 7, one sees that
what is needed to det.e r-m i.ne construction costs is the number
of new vessels that are needed each year' until the maximum
number is reached" In the case of. the larger BMRT's, new
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vessels we r e added up to 1966, after which the existing
fleet was adequate. For the SRTRI s , there were n ow
additions up until 1973 and for the smaller SRTt s , 1969
was the last year for new addit~ons.
Pro m this net gain in vessels each year, we can
(1) establ~sh total expenditures necessary for the bu~lding
of the vesscls, and (2) estimate financial depreciation,
an important item in western economies. In Figure 8, the
bottom set of figures provides an estimated cost of con-
structing a fleet of vessels similar to those of the Soviet
Union, which could have h arvest.e d the same catch and done
I
it in the same number of days on the grounds~ This fleet
would have cost from 196]-1973 a minimum of 334.2 million
dolla rs to c on.s t.r-uct., This figure is based on an average
ilMR'l' having a gross weight of 3,000 tons, an average SRTR
having a gross ",'eight of 575 t,ons, and an average 3RT having
a gross weight of 265 tons.
The financial COHt of depreciation is a variable
expenditure depending on many ·things ~ First, there is the
service life of the item being depreciated. Second, there
' i s the financial objective of the firm or nation doing the
depreciating. 'rhird, there is the technological advance-
men L in the genera:L c uLt.u re , whi.ch mayor may not increase
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the rate of depreciation of a p i.e c e of equipment. These
Bre but a few of the reasons for choosing a certain rate of
depreciation. . Inflation and market conditions can also
gre~tly aff~ct this rate. The three types of vessels chosen
as exnmples in this study are all affected differently by
depreciation and the reasons for depreciation given here.
Syseov feels that a service life of 33 years is feasible
and expected for a BMRT. This would give a yearly depre-
ciation rate of 3%. However, for a western economic system
where taxes and resale are of importance to the overall
financial picture, this would be an extremely low rate of
depreciation. 'l'herefore, a straight.. line depreciation will
be applied. to the fleet, with the BMRT I S having a life of
20 years, the SRTR's 15 years, and, due to their s~ze and
Crad.i.-til) l"i::.!.J.. ·:b s i g n , the SRT I s will have a 10 year life.
Figure 9 gives the amounts and portrays by graph the potential
depreciation costs for the Soviet fleet. Using this graph,
therefor.e, it is estimated that the depreciation costs for
the Soviet fleet operating in ICNAF areas 5 and 6 from
1961-1973 was 142 million dollars.
Another major expenditure in any fishing operation
is labor. The Soviet fleet pays . its crews on a fixed rate
per day, plus a bonus for catching anything over their
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Western fleets, however, pay their crew a
percentage of the total gross receiptso Depending on the
size of the vessel and species being caught, a lay sy~tem of
wages has always been a traditional form of paying the wages
on a fishing v e s s e L, A typical lay system m.igh t by 60/40,
or 60 % to the crew and 40% to the boat o However, as the
vessel costs increase, the percent -Co the boaL might also
increase. Therefore, if the Soviet fleet we r-e operating on
a lay system, it might be a broken 55/45. In this s ys t.em ,
fuel and food might be extracted from the gross receipts,
and the net result would be divided. Fifty-five percent
would go to the crew, and 45% to ·the v e s s e L,
The final and perhaps most difficult cost to
estimate for this fleet is the cost of repair, replacement,
and general maintcnancco The data supplied only gives us
an idea of the number of days spent on r-ep a i.r-, It does not
supply us with actual costs o How many miles of wire ape
worn out, how many n ets lost, and how many tons of fish boxes
are consumed is a problem that cant t even be estimated.
Howove r, Syseov does g-ive us a percentage figure for these
items based on wh at, he classifies as the " prime cost of
fishing. 11 On our three typeo of vessels, the cost of the
wear and tear on fislling gear is an average 11 0 6%of the total
prime cost.
-38-
Fishing equipment accounts for 1.7% and current
repairs account for 14.6% of the total prime cost. Together,
these item~ account for an average 25% of the prime cost of
f " h i 21a s rang , In this same table, we find that fuel represents
an average of 5~2% of the prime cost. Therefore, we can
arrive at, us i ng our a Lr-e ady estimated fuel expenditures, a
figure of between 40 and 70 million dollars, depending on
which fuel figure one chases to use.
-39-
CONCLUSION
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
gave the fishermen and the fishing industry of the United
states an opportunity, the likes · of which they will never see
again. It also presented them with many regulatory and legal
problems, the likes of which they will continue to see for
many years. It has been the purpose of this study to provide
a potential answer to some of the frequently asked questions
that have arisen due to the FCMA. 'rhe first major question
that can rrow be answered--is the Soviet fleet, making enough
profit to be able to ignore the potential fines fo ~ violatin~
the FCMA? Let us take a final look at the figures and
de t.e rmine an answe r-,
As s h own in the output section, the Soviet fleet
could have received an estimated $1,143,600,000 for its fish
if, in fact, it had sold them on the free market. As sum.i.ng
a lay system, as described in the input section, one would
deduct fuel costs of 8-14 million dollars, and then arrive
at a figure of an estimated return to the fleet of 508 million
dollars, and wages of 621 million do Ll.a r-s ; Be f o r-e we proceed,
however', consideration must be given to the fact that Syscov
states that wages arc an avc r -age 28% of the prime cost of
production o This would mean thntthc return to t-he crews of
-40-
SOy let f Lec t wo u Ld actually be an estimated 80 million
dollars, or about 13% of what they would have received if
they had been working on a vessel from onc of the free
market na tions o This would give the Soviet fleet an
estimated r eturn of $1,060, 000, 000, or just about t\'iice the
return to the western capitalist. Estimated expenses would
be as follows: 334.2 million for vessel construction,
142 million for depreciation, and 70 million for general
maintenance. Due to the fact that the Soviet Union does not
not charge itself interest for money it borrows from itself,
there is no figure for the cost of money.22 Therefore,
total expenses are estimated to .be a mi.n i.mum of 546 million
dollars, leaving a net gain of an estimated 514 million
dollars, o r an average of 39.5 million dollars a year, enough
The second question, however, gives us a better
.i.nd.i.c a tzi.on of whether or not the Soviet fleet did, in fact,
make moneyo That question is, with the 200-mile limit giving
the fishing industry such an opportunity, are the fleets of
large v~ssels of the Sovief Union the most economic way to
harvest fish? Returning to the lay system, we find that if
this fleet had been operati.ng on a western economic ~ystem,
it would have lost its investors a minimum of 38 million dollars.
-41-
In this system, there would be a cost f o r- the lending
of money, and this cost would add an estimated 15 million
dollars to the major expenses of the fleet, increasing the
total los s to an estimated S3 mi.L l .Lo n do Ll.a r s ,
There are a fe\~' problems that occur- when attemptj.ng
to apply this overview technique to the fleets of todayo The
first is, of course, the fact that this study takes place
before the great inflationary spiral that was brought on by
I
.'
tIle OPEC nations in 1974& Because of this, the world-wide
price of fuel has risen an estimated 87%. Though the price
of fish has also r'isen, it is not known by this researcher
to what extent. One of the reasons for this study ending in
1973 is due to a lack of financial records from FAD after
that, d a b e , Another problem is that ·the rL~ ar-e few fleets of
larger vessels that have many new vessels. Due to the
shrinking of available territories, the world-wide demand
for new large .f i s h i ng vessels has decreased dramat~cally.
Therefore, there would be few, if any, construction costs
necessary for utilizing a new resource of fish, should the
Soviet Union .de c i de to do so.
Finally, there arc a number of missing clements to
this total picture. The costs and expenses of processing
plants have not been includcdo However, this can be justified
-42-
by the fe-.ct that this study used ex-vessel, not who Le s a Le
or retail prices, for the basis of its output figureso The
problem of time spent between the grounds and homeport was
not addressed due to . the lack of informati.on. Fi.nally, it
must be r-es t.at.e d that this study is merely an attempt to
establish costs, and should in no way be construed as being
the true facts, for until we initiate or demand an exchange
of economic information between ourselves and those countries
desiring to fish in our 200-mile conservation zone, we can
only estimate, and not determine, its ultimate worth to them e-
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